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PRODUCTIVITY AND THE DECLINE OF 
AMERICAN SPERM WHALING 
By George W. Shuster'*' 
But still another inquiry remains; one often agitated by the 
more recondite Nantucketers .... whether Leviathan can long en-
dure so wide a chase, and so remorseless a havoc; whether he must 
not at last be exterminated from the waters, and the last whale, like 
the last man, smoke his last pipe, and then himself evaporate in the 
final puff. 
-Herman Melville, Moby Dick) 1851 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever since man discovered he could learn by his mistakes, the 
analysis of failures has proved to be as productive as the analysis 
of success. Santayana stated that those who have no knowledge of 
history are condemned to repeat it. Thus a necessary function of 
the economic historian has always been the study of prior declines 
and falls. Only by continuous reappraisal can information on past 
errors be successfully utilized to obviate the necessity for present 
trials. 
Though perhaps of minor absolute significance by modern stan-
dards, one of the most dramatic industrial declines of the nine-
teenth century was the demise of the American whaling industry. 
As one of the most often cited of whaling historians, Walter S. 
Tower, wrote in 1907: "Practically no other industry in the coun-
try can present any parallel to the revolution that the whale 
fishery has undergone in the space of sixty years. From a business 
representing an invested capital of tens of millions of dollars, and 
giving employment to tens of thousands of men, it has fallen to 
a place where whaling is no longer of any great importance even to 
the communities from which it was carried on."1 
Among the explanations of this decline, the most commonly 
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stated is the discovery of oil in western Pennsylvania. in 1859.2 The 
availability of a cheaper substitute is seen, by this explanation, as 
drying up the demand for whale oil. In at least one account this 
explanation has been bolstered by citing the inaccurate, and at 
best coincidental, "fact" that the total tonnage recorded in the 
American whaling fleet reached its peak of 198,000 in the year 
1858, or one year before the discovery of petroleum.3 For what-
ever relevance it may have, the tonnage peak of about 233,000 tons 
was reached much earlier, in 1846.4 
Although this demand-oriented explanation has dominated the 
literature, the conclusion of the present study is that supply side 
factors may have been far more important in causing the decline in 
the American pursuit of whales. As the slaughter of whales con-
tinued for decades with increasing intensity, the whales became 
more scarce, greatly increasing unit production costs of whale 
products. In short, the primary cause of the decline in American 
whaling may well be traced to the demise of th(! whales them-
selves. 
DEMAND VERSUS SUPPLY SIDE EXPLANATIONS OF DECLINE 
That the demand side explanation should have so dominated 
the literature is not surprising in light of the general spirit per~ 
vading, and indeed informing, the industrial revolution and its 
concomitant technological achievements following one another 
in accelerating progression. In an age in which progress is viewed 
as a one-directional movement ever upward, the sideshow of fail-
ure is most naturally viewed, if viewed at all, as being caused by 
someone else's more successful mousetrap. Industrial evolution 
connotes one industrial mode becoming obsolete only when it is 
replaced by a newer, more efficient technique. The boundless op-
timism that characterized the industrial and geographical ex-
pansion of this country and Western civilization is in this way 
carried over into the historical analysis that later seeks to describe 
it. 
Contrasted to a manifest destiny view of industrial revolution 
which ultimately conceives of the earth as an environment capable 
of sustaining an infinite progression of new technologies is the 
more recent emerging appreciation of the earth as capable of 
sustaining only a finite amount of burdens.5 Failure in such a 
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world is often not the result of obsolescence bred by the newer 
and better; rather it may arise from too great a success in the par-
ticular pursuit in the face of the environment's own constraints. 
Correctly understood, the decline of American whaling seems to 
provide an historic example of this latter phenomenon. 
The PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE EIGHTH CENSUS illustrates 
the tension between these two interpretations of whaling's decline. 
Written in 1860 after the discovery of petroleum but before its 
impact could have been fully appreciated, it correctly diagnosed 
the whaling industry's basic difficulty, if not the degree of its ulti-
mate seriousness: "[aJ slight decline in the value of the whale 
fishery arose from the increasing scarcity of the whale in its 
former haunts."6 However, the same report went on to provide, 
in a curious mixture, some of the language underlying the de-
mand side philosophy that would later dominate, though not com-
pletely erase, the scarcity of supply interpretation: 
The scarcity of whale and other fish oils in the arts has been sup-
plied by an increased production of lard oil, and especially by that 
beneficient law of compensation which pervades the economy of 
nature, and when one provision fails her children, opens to them 
another in the exhaustive storehouse of her material resources, or 
leads out their mental energies upon new paths of discovery for 
the supply of their wants. Thus, when mankind was about to 
emerge from the simplicity of the primitive and pastoral ages, the 
more soft and fusible metals no longer sufficed for the artificer, and 
veins of iron ore revealed their wealth and use in the supply of his 
more artificial wants, and became potent agents of his future 
progress. When the elaboration of the metals and other igneous 
arts were fast sweeping the forests from the earth, the exhaustive 
treasures of fossil fuel, stored for his future use, were disclosed to 
man, and when the artificial sources of oil seemed about to fail, a 
substitute was discovered flowing in almost perennial fountains 
from the depths of those carboniferous strata.7 
It takes an almost imperceptible sleight of hand to convert the 
"law of compensation" recognizing scarcity as a cause for economic 
extinction into a "law of displacement" assigning the major exe-
cutioner's role to alternative developments. Chicken-and-egg 
obfuscation is all the cloud that is necessary for the invisible hand 
to convert the rule that failure breeds success into the rule that 
success breeds failure. 
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EVIDENCE ON THE SUPPLY SIDE 
Even though demand side explanations have predominated in 
the literature,8 the well-known fact that whaling voyages became 
longer and extended to more distant seas during the period9 has 
always kept the door open to interpretations relying more heavily 
on supply side considerations. However, evidence of longer voy-
ages and more distant whaling grounds1o is, without more, exceed-
ingly ambiguous. It is possible it could indeed signify increasing 
difficulty in the task of finding whales, but it could also result from 
the discovery of ever more fruitful whaling grounds and increas-
ing exploitation of the economies of scale implicit in longer 
voyages.u In short, evidence on productivity is necessary in order 
to decide whether the trend of longer voyages to more distant 
seas was primarily the result of the push of increasing scarcity in 
nearer and more familiar areas or the pull of greater vistas of 
plenty in newly discovered whaling groundsP 
There has been no study of production relationships in Ameri-
can whaling during the first half of the nineteenth century. A 
major reason for this lack may well be the notion, commonly 
exaggerated beyond its real importance, that there was extreme 
uncertainty in whale catchesY If this were true to any appreciable 
degree, it could mean that any attempts to develop normal produc-
tion relationships in whaling would prove fruitless. Any specifi-
cation of variables would necessarily leave out the most important 
of all, the element of chance. 
A major exponent of this view of whaling, Professor Tower, 
both illustrates it well and also provides inadvertently a clue to 
why it may be a distorted picture: 
A comparison of imports and the size of the fleet ... in a number 
of different years, will bring out vividly the uncertainty that always 
attended whaling operations. In a year when the fleet was large the 
imports might be small, while perhaps the next year a distinctly 
smaller fleet would bring in cargoes making up a far greater total 
for the year. 
A comparison of the figures for one or two instances will illus-
trate the point: 
The contrast between 1851 and 1854 is most marked. In the three 
years the number of vessels increased by 115-principally from New 
Bedford-but in the latter year the imports were distinctly smaller. 
One hundred of the 115 ships added were ships and brigs, represent-
SPERM WHALING 349 
SIZE OF WHALING FLEET AND QUANTITIES OF IMPORTS 
Gallons of Gallons of 
Year No. vessels sperm oil whale oil Lbs. bone 
1851 553 99,591 328,483 3,906,500 
1852 620 78,872 84,211 1,259,900 
1853 661 103,077 260,114 5,652,300 
1854 668 76,696 319,837 3,445,200 
ing an increase of at least $2,000,000 in the invested capital. The 
lapse of four years precludes the argument that the new vessels had 
not had time to secure a cargo and return home-a point that be-
comes still more manifest if the imports for 1855 and 1856 are con-
sidered.14 
The contrast between 1851 and 1854 which Tower points to is 
"marked" because although the number of vessels figure increased 
substantially, all production figures decreased slightly. Even more 
"marked" in the same respect is the contrast of 1851 and 1852 
where the number of vessels increased substantially, yet all pro-
duction figures decreased substantially. 
Tower's conclusion is based on a major conceptual error, how-
ever. Given the long voyages in whaling at this time, the appro-
priate input variable is hardly the total number of vessels in the 
fleet, which includes vessels docked in port and, more importantly, 
those still at sea during the year. The number of vessels bringing 
home the output measured in a given year would be far more 
satisfactory, though of course an index such as the ton-months of 
whaling effort that those returning ships represent would be even 
more ideal if available. Hohman gives figures for the number of 
vessels arriving in each year: 216, 127,213, and 214, for the years 
1851-1854, respectively.15 These input figures inject considerably 
more rationality into the output data. In particular, the sub-
stantial output decrease from 1851 to 1852 is readily explained by 
the correspondingly large decrease in the input variable, and 
similarly the slight output drop from 1851 to 1854 is certainly 
consistent with the small decrease in the number of ships return-
ing. 16 This example thus illustrates that despite the conventional 
wisdom, it may not be so foolish to attempt to find systematic 
production relationships in whaling after all. Particularly is this so 
in light of the finding discussed below that by 1850 whale catches 
were considerably less predictable than in earlier periods. 
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PRODUCTION RELATIONSHIPS IN SPERM WHALING 
Aggregation of production of various products through the use 
of prices in whaling poses all the usual problems in extreme 
formP Furthermore, since the sperm and whale oil products were 
to a large extent produced in two distinct arenas-the average 
sperm whaler bringing home approximately 90 percent sperm oil, 
and the average right whaler an even greater percentage of whale 
oil-it is feasible to divide the industry into components. Lastly, 
by focusing on sperm whaling alone, more specific information 
on the pressure exerted by whaling on the population of whales is 
possible, since the different rate and extent of such pressure on 
right whales does not cloud the estimates. For these reasons the 
present study was limited to ships engaging in sperm whaling ex-
clusively. 
Data from the individual ship listings provided by Alexander 
Starbuck18 were used to run regressions of barrels of sperm oil 
against the ship's tonnage.19 For the entire study period, 1820-
1849, the result was easily significant to the .01 level: 
barrels = -26.682 + 5.914 tons20 
(145.013) (.421) 
The standard error of the regression was 514 barrels, and compar-
ing this figure to the mean of barrels, 1987, gives an interesting 
insight of the dispersion in catches whaling entrepreneurs would 
have to face. On the average, about two-thirds of the voyages 
could be expected to bring home sperm oil within about 25 per-
cent on either side of the expected figure. That this type of 
result could be achieved using only one input variable and em-
bracing a period of years during which production relationships 
were changing, as discussed below, makes it clear that even on an 
individual ship basis whaling production was far more predictable 
than has generally been considered to have been the case. 
CHANGES OVER TIME, 1820-1849 
A consistent pattern emerges in the analysis of regressions of 
successive five-year periods between 1820 and 1849. Table I sum-
marizes the results. Beginning with 1830 there is a decrease in the 
amount of production per ton, and the variability of individual 
catches increases. Indeed, the period may conveniently be sepa-
rated into three successive stages: 21 
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TABLE I. REGRESSION RESULTS 
Coef-
ficient Num- Standard 
Value of of Ton- berof Error of Mean 
Time Constant nage Obser- T Sta- Regres- Mean of of 
Period Term Term vations R2 F-Test tistie sion Barrels Tons 
Entire period: 
1820-1849 -26.68 5.91 563 .260 (1/561) 14.04 514.0 1986.8 340.4 
(145.01) ( .42) 197.15 
Five-year periods: 
1820-1824 -599.79 7.65 70 .555 (1/68) 9.20 351.8 1740.5 306.0 
(257.73) ( .83) 84.70 
1825-1829 -202.99 7.28 121 .590 (1/ 119) 13.08 316.5 2224.3 333.2 
(187.78) ( .56) 171.11 
1830-1834 222.23 5.18 152 .202 (1/150) 6.17 574.2 2049.3 352.9 
(299.69) ( .84) 38.09 
1835-1839 62.14 5.72 103 .233 (1/101) 5.54 494.5 2048.1 347.1 
(361.76) (1.03) 30.69 
1840-1844 -73.98 5.51 79 .147 (1/77) 3.64 490.0 1860.9 350.8 
(533.94) (1.51) 13.26 
1845-1849 -5Q.68 4.68 38 .084 (1/36) 1.82 622.8 1529.5 337.3 
(873.78) (2.57) 3.31 
(1) The period 1820-1829 is characterized by high production 
per ton and reasonable predictability of catch, thus suggesting 
that during this decade the sperm whale was plentiful in the 
Pacific Ocean. In general, a ship could expect to obtain about 
7Y2 barrels of sperm oil per ton, or fairly close to capacity_22 
(2) The period 1830-1844 is characterized by decreased yields 
per ton, about 5 to 6 barrels of sperm oil, and increased uncer-
tainty of catch. However, since there was also a large increase in 
the number of ships engaged in this fishery compared to the 
former period, the number of sperm whales in the Pacific appears 
to have been still reasonably substantial. 
(3) The period 1845-1849 shows another marked decrease in 
yields, to less than 5 barrels per ton, and even greater uncertainty. 
By this time it is apparent that the sperm whale was becoming a 
scarce resource. 
These demarcations should only be used as rough guides, since 
the underlying five year periods have been arbitrarily imposed 
upon the data and there is some problem of lag involved since 
the dating of each voyage was by departure.23 Actually, of course, 
the increasing scarcity of the sperm whale was probably a more 
or less continuous process, as might be expected in any case in-
volving fairly rapid depletion of a natural resource that does not 
quickly replenish itself. 
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Aside from demonstrating the early decline of sperm whaling 
productivity, these equations have relevance to three related 
problems: 
(1) The significant negative constant term in the period of 
greatest productivity (1820-1829) is suggestive of increasing re-
turns to scale under conditions of plenty, anticipating larger 
average ship size in later decades. 
(2) The decline of sperm whaling helps to explain the absolute 
decline of Nantucket, the port most specialized in Pacific sperm 
whaling, beginning in the 1840's. 
(3) The decline of sperm whaling anticipates the decline of the 
entire whaling industry. The greatest total American sperm oil 
catch in any year, of over 5 million barrels, was brought home in 
1837, and was not approached again after 1845. The largest whale 
oil catch of over 10 million barrels was brought home in 1851, 
and not approached after 1854.24 
CONCLUSION 
These findings serve to explain and modify previous accounts 
of the decline of American whaling. It is easy to rationalize 
Tower's conclusion that "[ o]ne of the most potent causes working 
toward the downfall of whaling" was "the uncertainty of the busi-
ness"25 by saying that uncertainty was certainly magnified over 
time by the increasing scarcity of the sperm whale. At the same 
time, however, it is necessary to revise Tower's impression that 
such uncertainty had "always been the case with the whale 
fishery" .26 
Using Scammon's estimate of the amount of oil recovered from 
one sperm whale, Starbuck calculated that from 1804 through 
1876, 225,521 sperm whales were slaughtered by the American 
fleet. 27 The total world population of this type of whale, by com-
parison, is now estimated to be about 250,000.28 It is thus no sur-
prise that a major factor in the decline of this industry was excessive 
depletion of the whales themselves. This is not to deny that 
demand factors may have exercised an influence as well. It is to 
say that the demand side has probably been over-emphasized in the 
past. 
Herman Melville himself did not believe what the "more re-
condite N antucketers" were already telling him by 1851. Instead 
he answered his question "Will He Perish?": 
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. . . we account the whale immortal in his species, however 
perishable in his individuality. He swam the seas before the conti-
nents broke water; he once swam over the site of the Tuileries, and 
Windsor Castle, and the Kremlin. In Noah's flood he despised 
Noah's Ark; and if ever the world is to be again flooded, like the 
Netherlands, to kill off its rats, then the eternal whale will still 
survive, and rearing upon the topmost crest of the equatorial flood, 
spout his frothed defiance to the skies. 
Moby Dick) Chapter 105 
Yet it may not be accidental irony that one possible reading of his 
great whaling allegory is precisely that too triumphal success over 
Nature-slaying the White Whale-may involve man's-Ahab's 
own self-defeat. 
-.---<-<~t-~.­
FOOTNOTES 
* Yale Law School, Class of 1973; B.A., 1967; M.S., 1969. The 
author would like to thank Professor Peter Temin of M.LT. for his 
assistance. 
1 Tower, Walter S., A History of the American Whale Fishery, 
University of Pennsylvania Publications in Political Economy and 
Public Law, No. 20, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1907, p. 72. 
2 Thus Samuel Eliot Morison concludes that "[w]orld-wide whaling 
out of Sag Harbor, New Bedford, and other New England ports 
reached its apogee in the 1850's; the discovery of oil in Pennsylvania in 
1859 sounded its knell," The Oxford History of the American People, 
Oxford University Press, New York, N.Y., 1965, p. 584. In so conclud-
ing, Morison followed a well-established precedent of emphasis: (1) 
"[w]ith the discovery of oil in Pennsylvania the prosperous days of the 
whale fisheries ended," Jennings, Walter W., A History of Economic 
Progress in the United States, Thomas Crowell Co., New York, N.Y., 
1926, p. 496; (2) "[t]he period of the Civil War abruptly marked the 
decline of whaling. Petroleum was displacing whale oil as illuminant 
and lubricant, and natural gas was making inroads. These were the en-
during causes of decay," Mitchell, B., and Mitchell, L.P., American 
Economic History) Houghton Mifflin Co., Cambridge, Mass., 1947, p. 
419; and (3) "[a] rapid decline ensued when petroleum provided a 
cheaper substitute for the main product," Wright, Chester W., Eco-
nomic History of the United States, McGraw-Hill Book Co., New 
York, N.Y., p. 309. 
3 Faulkner, Harold U., American Economic History, Harper and 
Row, New York, N.Y., 1960, p. 231. 
4 Tower's series has a peak of 233,262 tons reached in 1846, Tower, 
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op. cit., p. 121. Hohman's peak is 233,189 tons, in the same year, Hoh-
man, Elmo Paul, The American Whaleman) A Study of Life and 
Labor in the Whaling Industry, Longmans, Green, and Co., New 
York, N.Y., 1928, p. 45. 
5 Another way of expressing the contrast is to say that the causes of 
extinction need not proceed by Schumpeterian cycles. No rule suggests 
that economic evolution can only take place through the displacement 
of successive forms by more potent competitors. An economic death 
can occur as the result of natural forces even before the ultimate sub-
stitute, if any, is yet born. 
6 Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census, 1860, p. 70. 
7Id. 
B Another "demand side" explanation that is sometimes mentioned 
is the change in women's fashions, which meant that whalebone was 
no longer a very marketable commodity. However, even the timing 
is wrong for this explanation, since the decline in whaling greatly 
preceded the change in fashion. See johnson, Van Metre, Huebner, 
and Hanchett, History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the 
United States, Vol. II, Carnegie Institution of Washington, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1915, p. 171. 
9 For example, voyages from Nantucket to the Pacific increased 
from about two years in the first decade of the century to about four 
years in the 1840's. The mid-point of about three years was reached 
about 1830. From data in Starbuck, Alexander, History of the Ameri-
can Whale Fishery) From Its Earliest Inception to the Year 1876, pub-
lished by the author, Waltham, Mass., 1878. 
10 Note that the two facts are not the same. Even for the same 
whaling grounds, for example, voyages could increase in length of 
cruising time if whales became more scarce. 
11 The most obvious cause of the latter is of course the fact that for 
fixed whaling grounds a longer voyage maximizes the proportion of 
time spent in actual whaling as opposed to transit. 
12 Evidence on productivity can come from many sources. Beside the 
direct estimates calculated in this study, indirect indicators of decreas-
ing productivity and increasing scarcity can be found. For example, 
two years before petroleum was discovered, Scientific American noted: 
"The whale oils which hitherto have been much relied on in this 
country to furnish light, are yearly becoming more scarce, and may 
in time almost entirely fail ... ," Scientific American) Vol. XII, june 
27, 1857, p. 239, as quoted in Louis C. Hunter, "Products of the 
Earth, 1866-1918," The Growth of the American Economy (H.F. 
Williamson, ed.), Prentice Hall, New York, N.Y., 1951, p. 46. 
13 Edmund Burke, in a commonly quoted speech in 1774, referred 
to American Whaling as "their most perilous mode of hardy industry", 
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quoted by Pitkin, Timothy, A Statistical View of the Commerce of 
the United States of America, (1816, Hartford, Charles Hosmer), re-
printed by Augustus M. Kelley, New York, N.Y., 1967, pp. 43-44. 
Tower talks of "the uncertainty of the business," op. cit., p. 72; Star-
buck discusses "the many perils encountered in this pursuit," and the 
"ups and downs of the business," op. cit., p. 145; and Hohman states 
that: "The most significant and certainly the most troublesome feature 
of whaling, as viewed by an entrepreneur, was its element of risk. No 
other well-established and legitimate industry was subject to such wild 
and unpredictable fluctuations of fortune. Financial returns ranged 
from ruinous losses to fabulous gains; and the whaling merchant be-
came not only a vendor of oil and bone, but also, and preeminently, a 
dealer in risks," op. cit., p. 272. 
14 Tower, op. cit., pp. 118-19. Note that aggregate uncertainty, based 
on annual averages, implies far greater individual ship uncertainty. 
15 Hohman, op. cit., pp 328-29. 
16 Focusing only on sperm whaling a similarly imperfect but hardly 
irreconcilable picture emerges: 
Year 
1851 
1852 
1853 
1854 
- Hohman, op. cit., pp. 328-29. 
Vessels Arriving-
53 
50 
64 
34 
Gallons of Sperm Oil 
99,591 
78,872 
103,077 
76,696 
17 The large increase in the price of whalebone from a low of seven 
cents a pound in 1807 to a high of 96Y2 cents in 1857, and the conse-
quent or related shift into its production, is the most striking practical 
difficulty. The prices of sperm and whale oil also fluctuated a great 
deal during this period, Tower, op. cit., p. 128. 
18 Starbuck records, for all voyages of which he had a report, such 
items as home port, date of sailing, date of return, tonnage of ship, 
captain and owner of ship, destination, and barrels of sperm oil, bar-
rels of whale oil, and pounds of whalebone brought home, as well as 
an occasional comment on matters such as the unfortunate death of the 
captain. For many entries the data is incomplete but given the very 
large listing, this constitutes a relatively minor problem. In the interests 
of narrowing the study here, data were obtained on entries which had 
the following information complete and met the following character-
istics: 
1) sailed between 1820 and 1849 inclusive, 
2) sailed from either Nantucket or New Bedford, 
3) sailed to the Pacific Ocean, 
4) sailing date listed, 
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5) return date listed, 
6) tonnage listed, 
7) ships only (barks, brigs, etc., excluded), 
8) brought home only sperm oil (no whale oil or whalebone). 
This subsample numbered 563 voyages. 
Starbuck's data is not without its problems. Starbuck himself mentions 
the following difficulties: 
1) Oil sold by ships in foreign ports to pay for repairs is not reported. 
(However, where known, Starbuck lists such oil in his additional com-
ments section. Where he did so, the amount has been included here.) 
2) Oil not reported in the shipping journals was not reported. 
3) Crediting oil to ships of the same name from the same home port was 
done in Starbuck's best judgment. 
4) Oil was sent home in casks, which may have a variable number of 
barrels. 
Starbuck used a constant of 4Y2 barrels to the cask where conversion 
had to be made. (Even the barrel was apparently variable. Robotti puts 
a barrel at 30 gallons of oil, Robotti, Frances D., Whaling and Old 
Salem, Fountainhead Publishers, New York, N.Y., 1962, p. 40. Tower, 
op. cit., p. 126, uses a conversion factor of 31Y2 gallons per barrel.) 
In addition to these problems there is the omnipresent bane of print-
er's error, as illustrated by the fact that sometimes ships are listed as 
returning before they have left. The effect of all these problems is 
probably to increase the variability of the variables, thus decreasing 
"goodness of fit," and possibly biasing the estimates of parameters. Add 
to this the fact that nowhere do we have information on all factors of 
production, and the result is necessarily the expectation that only a 
limited amount of the production relationship will be described. Star-
buck's data does have the crucial advantage of allowing one to deal 
with individual ship data. Variations are not smoothed out by the 
aggregate averaging process. Thus the variation that is observed here 
is probably greater than would have faced the actual whaler. 
19 Regressions were also run with length of voyage as a second in-
dependent variable, but these did not add anything of value to the 
discussion here. One interesting result, not entirely unsuspected, was 
the consistent negative sign attached to this variable, reflecting perhaps 
the dogged determination of Yankee captains to stay out despite, in-
deed because of, repeated disappointments. See Hohman, op. cit., p. 
86, for an explanation of this behavior in terms of the implicit rule of 
full-ship-or-do-not-return. 
20 Full regression results are reported in Table I. 
21 The F-test described by Chow, which employs information on 
error sums of squares and degrees of freedom, was used to determine if 
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these three periods were indeed significantly different in a statistical 
sense. The results easily pass the .01 significance level, indicating that 
each of the three periods does indeed differ from those adjacent. See 
Chow, Gregory, "Tests of Equality Between Two Sets of Coefficients 
in Two Sets of Regressions", Econometrica, July, 1960, pages 591-605. 
22 To determine ship capacities, all ships bringing home only oil, 
whale or sperm or both, which left the ports of Nantucket or New 
Bedford between the years 1800-1835 inclusive were analyzed in two 
groups, by port. The barrel returns were then listed in categories 
according to ship tonnage: up to 199 tons, every ten tons up to 399 
tons, then 400-49 tons, and 450 tons and up. Then the approximately 
top ten percent of the barrel observations in each of the 23 tonnage 
classes were averaged, and these 23 observations formed the data for 
the two regressions of total barrels on tonnage. Both the Nantucket 
and the New Bedford regressions were similar, with insignificant con-
stant terms, a slightly greater than 8.0 coefficient for tonnage, and R2 
values of .948 and .924 respectively. 
This method of determining approximate capacity could be ques-
tioned. However, the goodness of fit and the great similarity between 
the two estimates suggest that something approximating ship capacity 
may be measured by the rule-of-thumb of eight barrels to a ton. 
23 The fact that the groupings may be somewhat arbitrary is illus-
trated by the fact that Chow tests showed a significant (.01 level) differ-
ence between the first three successive five-year periods, but not be-
tween any two successive five-year periods after that point. The succes-
sive ten-year periods all differ from each other at the .01 level. 
24 Tower, op. cit., page 126. Other aggregate data reinforces the con-
clusion derived from productivity analysis that whaling was in decline 
much earlier than 1859. In terms of total number of vessels in the fleet 
the series provided by Tower, Hohman, and Starbuck reached peaks 
of 736, 735, and 731, in the years 1846, 1846, and 1845, respectively. 
Op. cit., pages 121, 45, and 662 ff., respectively. In terms of total ton-
nage in the fleet, the series provided by these same three authors reached 
peaks of 233,262 (1846), 233,189 (1846), and 233,149 (1845), respec-
tively. Op. Cit., pages 121, 45, and 662 ff., respectively. Finally, Star-
buck records the peak of number of vessels returning home as 257 
in 1845. Op. cit., pages 662 ff. 
25 Tower, op. cit., page 72. 
26 Tower, op. cit., page 72. 
27 Starbuck, op. cit., page 661. 
28 Scheffer, Victor B., The Year of the Whale, Charles Scribner's 
Sons, New York, N.Y., 1969. The author intended this as only a rough 
estimate; precise estimates are not available. 
